The United States has passed through two global “hegemonic” moments - the first in the late 1940s to early 1950s, the second from 1992 to 2001. In the former case, the end of World War II left the United States as the single largest economic and military power, one that drove European reconstruction and stood against the rising Soviet Union. This moment began eroding with the USSR’s 1949 nuclear test, and was largely erased by the U.S. “police action” in the three-year-long Korean War. The latter case was precipitated by the final collapse of the Soviet Union, where the United States was left preeminent by default, and ended with the al Qaeda attack on New York and Washington DC in2001, but also with China’s accession to the World Trade Organization that same year.
Aside from these brief interregnums, the United States has largely managed its international relations and national interests through a combination of assertions of non-interference and (at times) asserted isolationism or through alliances, partnerships, and selective interventions to support and maintain a balance of power in Eurasia. Even during the periods of semi-isolationism, or prior to the United States’ emergence on the international stage with its victories in the Spanish-American War, Washington often used selective partnerships and participation in international interventions to ensure its own core interests - whether through its Open Door policy in Asia, its engagement with the Barbary Pirates, or its quiet strengthening of North Atlantic neighbors in the lead up to World War II.
Except for a brief surge of imperial fervor at the dawn of the Twentieth Century, for most of its history the United States has pursued either a policy of non-engagement in Eurasian affairs (though at times was dragged in anyway, as seen in the early 1800s), or a crafted balance of power strategy to counter the rise of any Eurasian hegemony (whether Germany or later the Soviet Union). Even U.S. policies in Asia in the 1840s were designed to deter the domination of Asia by a single European power, and retain U.S. access to lucrative trading routes. A balance of power required developing and maintaining partnerships and alliances. These could change (Washington was aligned with Moscow and opposed to Berlin during World War II, opposed to Beijing and later aligned with it during the Cold War). Such alignment didn’t always require strong alliances(with their attendant requirements), but it did require partners - the UnitedStates has rarely possessed the economic, military, and political power to simply impose its will on the world without forming some sort of coalition.
Today, just as Kissinger wrestled with in the late 1960s, the United States is at a point where it is reconsidering how to manage its strategic position in a multipolar world. In his 1968 essay, Kissinger noted that the world was “bipolar militarily but multipolar politically,” a nuance often forgotten when considering the complexities of the Cold War era. If today we consider military power alone, particularly nuclear weapons, the world appears heading toward a new tripolar structure, with China in the midst of the world’s largest nuclear breakout since the 1950s. If we think in terms of economic power, there is a different tripolar structure, comprising the United States, the European Union, and China. In terms of political influence, whether formal or informal, all four may play a role (though Russian political power appears significantly lower than the other three, except in a few narrow geographies). But we also have a world where middle powers and developing countries are gaining ground in the overall global balance of power, whether through economic growth, technological advancement and application, or the democratization of modern weapons systems. Even more so than in Kissinger’s late 1960s world, the United States must manage its interests and ideals in a very complex international environment.
Though we are only in the very early months of the new administration of President Donald Trump, there are signs of a major shift in U.S. foreign policy. Not necessarily between which parties to partner or ally with, but whether a balance of power strategy should be replaced with a more imperial strategy, one where the United States expands its own sphere of influence (whether through trade policies or territorial aggrandizement), and ultimately accepts that other major powers (namely China and Russia) should each be left in their own imperial sphere. This would mark a substantial shift in U.S. foreign policy, far beyond expecting more local action by the Europeans in Europe or the Asians in Asia. It would be a return to a much older structure to manage multipolarity, one that raises significant questions about the constraints on imperial boundaries (formal or otherwise) and whether dividing the world into spheres can be a viable security strategy in today’s world of advanced communications and transportation technologies and heightened demands for a wider variety of key minerals and commodities.
At this point, in action the United States does not appear to have yet made this shift - there is still quite a bit of urging Europe to take on more of the primary security responsibilities in Europe, and for Asian countries to do the same in their region. But in short, the United States recognizes that it has limited capacity in the modern world, and thus must prioritize its engagement and interactions. As Kissinger phrased it, “Our contribution should not be the sole or principal effort, but it should make the difference between success and failure.” But to be successful, it requires a clear understanding and articulation of just what U.S. priorities are, and that in turn requires a clear assertion of U.S. strategic interests. Within the current administration, this core question appears unresolved. As the administration settles in over the next few months, we will continue to watch for clarity or movement toward a common set of principles and priorities which will shed light on the core question - is the balance of power still the main tool of maintaining U.S. interests and security internationally, or are we seeing a radical return to an imperial concept of spheres of influence?
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